US labor share

Nonfarm business labor share index (2017 = 100) · BLS preliminary estimate

Q4 2027 median

92.0

10th–90th percentile: 89.0 to 95.4

Labor share index (2017 = 100)

828486889092949698Forecast · 14 Sep 2026
  • Forecast median
  • 10th–90th percentile
Labor share index (2017 = 100) by quarter
Quarter10th percentileMedian90th percentile
Q3 202691.593.094.4
Q4 202690.892.694.6
Q1 202790.392.494.8
Q2 202789.892.395.0
Q3 202789.492.195.2
Q4 202789.092.095.4
Q1 202888.691.895.6
Q2 202888.391.795.7
Q3 202887.991.695.9
Q4 202887.591.596.0
Q1 202987.291.496.1
Q2 202986.891.396.2
Q3 202986.591.296.3
Q4 202986.291.196.4
Q1 203085.991.096.5
Q2 203085.691.096.6
Q3 203085.390.996.7
Q4 203085.090.896.7
Q1 203184.790.796.8
Q2 203184.490.696.9
Q3 203184.190.597.0

Model reasoning

This question asks what BLS will print, in its first estimate each quarter, for the share of nonfarm business output going to labor — indexed so that 2017 equals 100. For the next release (Q3 2026, due November 5), this forecast centers on 93.0, with an 80% range of 91.5 to 94.4. Five years out, at Q3 2031, the center is 90.5, with a much wider range of 84.1 to 97.0.

Where things stand: the index was 93.4 in Q2 2026, which BLS reported as a labor share of 52.8% of output — the lowest in a series that goes back to 1947. It has fallen 4.4 points in five quarters. The mechanics matter. This index is essentially unit labor costs divided by the price of what the sector produces, and the recent collapse is mostly a price story, not a wage collapse: the nonfarm business output deflator rose 7.4% annualized in Q2 while hourly compensation rose only 2.6%. Unit nonlabor payments jumped 14.8%, and nonfinancial corporate unit profits rose 43% annualized. An oil shock, tariff pass-through, and record profit margins did most of the work.

That's why the forecast expects continued slippage but nothing like a continuation of the recent pace. Strong tracked output growth (GDPNow near 4.4% for Q3) against roughly 3% wage growth points to one more soft quarter. Beyond that, two things pull upward: a 7%-plus output deflator is not a trend, and profit margins at records have a strong history of mean-reverting. Labor share is also countercyclical — a recession would push it up sharply, since profits fall faster than wages. Pulling downward: AI-related capital deepening (including the depreciation on that capital, which mechanically reduces labor's measured share), weak bargaining power, and the fact that the 2022 step-down never reversed. The forecast splits these, landing on drift of roughly half a point a year rather than the recent four. The biggest open question is whether 2025–26 was a transitory price shock or the opening of a genuine AI-driven regime shift — that lives in the fat lower tail, not the median.

Two things would move this most: the November 5 print itself, especially outside 91.5–94.0, and the direction of output prices — a ceasefire dropping oil sharply, or evidence that margins are staying at Q2 levels. Note also that first releases routinely differ from later revisions by half a point or more, which is baked into the bands.

Resolution criteria

Question. For each quarter, what is the BLS nonfarm business sector labor share index (series PRS85006173, 2017 = 100) in the preliminary Productivity and Costs release for that quarter?

Resolution rules.

  • Use the preliminary (first) release for the quarter.
  • Ignore the revised release and annual benchmark revisions.
  • If BLS changes the base year, convert to 2017 = 100 using BLS's published rebasing factor and annotate.

Resolving source. bls.gov Productivity and Costs news release and accompanying tables.

Release timing. BLS publishes first estimates within 40 days of quarter close. Q3 2026 preliminary: 2026-11-05. Q4 2026 preliminary: early February 2027.

Forecast periods. Q3 2026 through Q3 2031, every quarter (21 periods).

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